Perfected

BIRTH, DEATH, AND MARRIAGE RECORDS (SECTION 193.265)

This act waives any required fees for the issuance or copy of a birth certificate if the request is made by a prosecuting or circuit attorney or the Attorney General.

This provision is identical to a provision in SCS/SB 897 (2024), in HCS/SS#3/SB 22 (2023), SB 464 (2023) and in HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 (2023), and is substantially similar to a provision in HCS/SS/SCS/SB 40 (2023) and HB 81 (2023).

CHANGES OF ATTORNEYS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES (SECTIONS 287.200 AND 287.470)

The act permits the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") to change the name, information, or fee arrangement of the attorney or law firm representing a claimant upon the filing of a written agreement, signed by both the claimant and the attorney, with the Commission.

These provisions are identical to provisions in SCS/SB 1390 (2024).

COMPLAINTS, DISCIPLINE, AND REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (SECTIONS 287.610 AND 621.045)

Current law requires a retention vote be taken by the Administrative Law Judge Review Committee ("Committee") with respect to each workers' compensation Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Additionally, the Committee is required to conduct performance audits periodically and make recommendations of confidence or no confidence with respect to each ALJ. This act repeals these requirements and instead creates new provisions for filing complaints against and removing ALJs.

Specifically, the Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation is permitted to file a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission ("AHC") seeking to remove an ALJ from office for one or any combination of the following causes:

(1) The ALJ has committed any criminal offense, regardless of whether a criminal charge has been filed;

(2) The ALJ has been convicted, or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal prosecution under the laws of any state, the United States, or of any country, regardless of whether sentence is imposed or is guilty of misconduct;

(3) Habitual intoxication;

(4) Willful neglect of duty;

(5) Corruption in office;

(6) Incompetency; or

(7) The ALJ has committed any act that involves moral turpitude or oppression in office.

Prior to filing a complaint, the Director shall notify the ALJ in writing of the reasons for the complaint. Special provisions are included if the reason for the complaint is willful neglect of duty or incompetency.

Upon a finding by the AHC that the grounds for disciplinary action are met, the Director may, singly or in combination, issue the disciplinary actions against the ALJ, as provided in the act, including removal or suspension from office or there are no grounds for disciplinary action, the ALJ shall immediately resume duties and shall receive any attorney's fees due under current law.

An ALJ may be suspended with pay, without notice, at the discretion of the Director if:

(1) The ALJ commits a crime for which the ALJ is being held without bond for a period of more than 14 days;

(2) The ALJ's license to practice law has been suspended or revoked; or

(3) A declaration of incapacity by a court of competent jurisdiction has been made with respect to the ALJ.

The act repeals a requirement that the Committee's members not have any direct or indirect employment or financial connection with a workers' compensation insurance company, claims adjustment company, health care provider nor be a practicing workers' compensation attorney. The act additionally repeals a requirement that all members of the Committee have a working knowledge of workers' compensation.

These provisions are substantially similar to SCS/SB 1390 (2024) and is similar to HB 2194 (2024).

PAYMENT AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (SECTIONS 287.615, 287.812, AND 287.835)

The act provides that the compensation for Administrative Law Judges ("ALJ")and chief administrative law judges shall be determined solely by the rate outlined in law and shall not increase when pay raises for executive employees are appropriated.

The act furthermore repeals reference to the position of Chief Legal Counsel.

The act repeals a prohibition on the payment of any retirement benefits under workers' compensation law to any administrative law judge who has been removed from office by impeachment or for misconduct, or to any person who has been disbarred from the practice of law, or to the beneficiary of any such persons.

These provisions are substantially similar to SCS/SB 1390 (2024) and is similar to HB 2194 (2024).

TOWING OF ABANDONED OR DERELICT VEHICLES (SECTION 304.155)

Current law provides that any law enforcement officer within the officer's jurisdiction, or an officer of a government agency where that agency's real property is concerned, may authorize a towing company to remove to a place of safety any abandoned property which due to state or local law is subject towing because of the owner's outstanding traffic or parking violations. This act modifies the provision to authorize the towing of abandoned or derelict property which due to any other state law or local ordinance is subject to civil forfeiture and towing under the Criminal Activity Civil Forfeiture Act because of the owner's outstanding traffic or parking violations.

COURT DISSOLUTION OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (SECTION 347.143)

This act modifies the procedure by which a court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company. Specifically, in addition to circumstances where it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the operating agreement, the court may issue such a decree if it determines:

(1) Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining members;

(2) The business of the limited liability company has been abandoned;

(3) The management of the limited liability company is deadlocked or subject to internal dissension; or

(4) Those in control of the limited liability company have been found guilty of, or have knowingly countenanced, persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority.

This provision is identical to a provision in SCS/SB 897 (2024), in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 85 (2023), HB 278 (2023), SB 401 (2023), and SB 475 (2023), and is substantially similar to HB 1458 (2024).

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES (SECTIONS 435.014 AND 435.300 TO 435.312)

This act establishes provisions relating to procedures for alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") processes. A court may refer, either by rule or order, any individual civil case or category of civil cases to any nonbinding ADR process. Within 30 days of referral, the parties may:

(1) Notify the court that the parties have chosen pursuant to a written agreement to pursue an ADR process different from the ADR process chosen by the court;

(2) Notify the court that the parties have agreed to delay such ADR process until a date certain; or

(3) If any party, after conferring with the other parties, concludes that the ADR process has no reasonable chance of helping the parties understand or resolve a procedural or substantive issue or if there is a compelling circumstance, the party may file a motion to not participate in the ADR process.

Once a motion has been filed, the ADR process shall not occur until a ruling and, if granted, the matter shall not be referred without compelling circumstances. In any action referred to an ADR process, discovery may proceed in any other action before, during, and after the ADR process, except the court may stay discovery to promote savings in time and expense.

A neutral individual ("neutral") appointed by the court or requested by the parties to serve in the ADR process shall avoid any conflict of interest. Even if the neutral believes that no disqualifying conflict exists, the neutral shall:

(1) Before agreeing to serve, make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether there are facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the neutral has a conflict of interest;

(2) As soon as practicable, disclose reasonably known facts relevant to any conflicts of interest; and

(3) After accepting a designation, disclose any previously undisclosed information that could reasonably suggest a conflict of interest.

After disclosure of a conflict, the ADR process may proceed if all parties have agreed in writing or if the organization administering the ADR process determines under the parties' written agreement that the neutral may continue to serve. Any party believing a court-appointed neutral has a conflict of interest may request for the neutral to recuse himself or may file a motion for disqualification. Additionally, the court may require a change of a neutral if necessary to protect the rights of an unrepresented party.

ADR communications, as defined in the act, shall not be admissible as evidence in any proceeding or subject to discovery. However, evidence that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery shall not be inadmissible or protected from discovery solely because of its disclosure or use in the ADR process. Additionally, a court may admit communications, upon motion by a party and following a hearing, if the court finds that the communication is relevant and admissible and was:

(1) Made in the presence of a mandated reporter and pertains to abuse or neglect that such mandated reporter is required to report;

(2) A substantial threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm that is reasonably certain to occur;

(3) Intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime; or

(4) Necessary to establish or defend against a professional misconduct or malpractice claim that is based on conduct occurring during the ADR process.

If requested by a party or if necessary to ensure confidentiality, the hearing shall be conducted in the judge's chambers. A participant, including the neutral, has standing to intervene in any proceedings in order to object to the admissibility of communications made by such participant.

Additionally, this act provides that no neutral, or agent or employee of the neutral or of the neutral's organization, shall be subpoenaed or compelled to disclose any ADR communication. No neutral who is a licensed attorney shall be required to disclose any ADR communication of which a reporting obligation in the rules of professional conduct of attorneys might otherwise apply. However, a neutral may be subpoenaed to enforce a written settlement agreement, but only to testify that the parties signed such agreement in his or her presence. The court may order the party seeking admission of an ADR communication to pay the costs and fees of the neutral or any other participant who intervenes to contest the admission or who responds to a subpoena regarding the ADR communications.

Unless a written agreement provides for a binding ADR process, the processes conducted pursuant to this act shall be nonbinding. Furthermore, this act shall not preclude any court from referring any matter to a nonbinding ADR process.

This act shall only apply to ADR processes referred by court order or rule or by a written agreement of the parties expressly providing for this act to apply. This act is not intended to undermine the right to a jury trial nor does this act require any party to settle any claim or attend a mediation with counsel.

If the court has not referred the parties to an ADR process or if the parties elect not to use the provisions of this act, the process shall be regarded as settlement negotiations. If the parties have agreed in writing to an ADR process but have not invoked the provisions of this act, the neutral shall not be subpoenaed or otherwise compelled to disclose any matter revealed in the setting up or conducting of such ADR process. Finally, this act requires all settlement agreements to be in writing.

These provisions are identical to provisions in SCS/SB 897 (2024), SB 1096 (2024), and in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), and are substantially similar to HB 1456 (2024), provisions in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 82 (2023), SB 215 (2023), provisions in SCS/HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), SB 1148 (2022), SB 591 (2021), HB 953 (2021), and HB 2534 (2020), and are similar to HB 2660 (2022).

BENTLEY AND MASON'S LAW (SECTION 454.1050)

This act establishes "Bentley and Mason's Law" which provides that if a person is convicted of the offense of driving while intoxicated and such offense caused the death of a parent or guardian, such person shall pay, pursuant to a court order, a monthly restitution to the child of the deceased parent or guardian until the child reaches 18 years of age.

Monthly restitution shall be determined and remitted as specified in the act. If the person ordered to pay restitution is unable to make required monthly payments because such person is imprisoned or otherwise confined, then the person shall begin making the payments no later than the first anniversary of the date of his or her release from the correctional facility and shall pay all arrearages, regardless of whether the payments were due to be terminated while the person was imprisoned or otherwise confined.

The amount of restitution paid under this act shall be deducted from any civil judgment against the defendant.

The Attorney General or a person, parent, or guardian of a child due restitution under this act may enforce a restitution order issued in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.

This provision is identical to SB 1374 (2024), HB 1958 (2024), a provision in HCS/HB 2700 (2024), and HB 1954 (2022).

MISSOURI ELECTRONIC WILLS AND ELECTRONIC ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS ACT (SECTIONS 474.540 TO 474.564)

This act establishes the "Missouri Electronic Wills and Electronic Estate Planning Documents Act", which provides for the execution of wills through electronic methods.

An electronic will shall be a will for all purposes of the laws of this state. An electronic will is a record that is readable, and remains accessible, as text at the time of signing by the testator or by another individual in the testator's name, in the testator's physical presence, and by the testator's direction. Additionally, an electronic will shall be signed by at least two individuals in the physical or electronic presence of the testator within a reasonable amount of time after witnessing the signing of the will or acknowledgment of the will or signing. Additionally, this act provides that an electronic will not executed in compliance with these requirements shall still be an electronic will under this act if executed in compliance with the law of the jurisdiction where the testator is physically located, domiciled, or resides when the will was signed or where the testator is domiciled or resides upon his or her death.

The intent of the testator that the record be an electronic will may be established by extrinsic evidence. As provided in the act, an electronic will may be made self-proving by acknowledgment of the testator.

An electronic will may revoke all or part of a previous will and an electronic will shall be revoked by use of:

(1) A subsequent will that revokes the electronic will expressly or by inconsistency;

(2) A written instrument signed by the testator declaring the revocation; or

(3) A physical act, if established by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator, with the intent of revoking, performed or directed another individual to perform the act in the testator's physical presence.

Additionally, if there is evidence that a testator signed an electronic will, but neither the electronic will nor a certified paper copy can be located after a testator's death, there shall be a presumption that the testator revoked the electronic will, even if no instrument or later will revoking such electronic will can be located. At any time during the administration of the estate or as determined by the court if there is no grant of administration, the court may issue an order for a custodian of an account held under a terms-of-service agreement to disclose digital assets for purposes of obtaining an electronic will from the account of a deceased user.

Furthermore, this act provides that any written estate planning document, as defined in the act, may be executed electronically and no such estate planning document shall be invalid or void solely because of its electronic form or electronic signatures. Any written estate planning document that requires one or more witnesses to the signature of a principal may be witnessed by any individual in the electronic presence of the principal. Additionally, this act provides that a person who acts in reliance upon an electronically executed written estate planning document shall not be liable to any person for so relying and may assume without inquiry the valid execution of the electronically executed written estate planning document.

An individual may create a certified paper copy of an electronic will or estate planning document by affirming under penalty of perjury that a paper copy of the electronic will or document is a complete, true, and accurate copy. If a provision of law or rule of procedure requires a will or document to be presented or retained in its original form or provides consequences for the failure to present or retain the will or document in its original form, a certified paper copy shall satisfy the provision or rule.

This act also supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, except for certain provisions relating to consumer disclosures, and does not authorize electronic delivery of certain notices.

Finally, this act shall apply to any will of a decedent who dies on or after August 28, 2024, and to any written estate planning document signed or remotely witnessed on or after August 28, 2024.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), in HB 2109 (2024), and is substantially similar to provisions in SCS/SB 897 (2024), in SCS/SBs 1221 & 988 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in SB 569 (2023), and in HB 881 (2023).

ESTATE PLANNING DURING COVID-19 (SECTION 474.600)

With respect to the execution of an estate planning document, a person required for the execution of an estate planning document shall be deemed to have satisfied any physical presence requirement under Missouri law during the COVID-19 state of emergency if the following requirements were met:

(1) The signer affirmatively represented that he or she was physically in this state;

(2) The notary was physically located in this state and stated the county he or she was physically located in;

(3) The notary identified the signers to the satisfaction of the notary and Missouri law;

(4) Any person whose signature was required appeared using video conference software where live, interactive audio-visual communication between the principal, notary, and any other necessary person allowed for observation, direct interaction, and communication at the time of signing; and

(5) The notary recorded in his or her journal the exact time and means used to perform the act.

These requirements shall be deemed satisfied if a licensed Missouri attorney present at the remote execution signs a written acknowledgment made before an officer authorized to administer oaths and evidenced by the officer's certificate, which shall be affixed to or logically associated with the acknowledgment.

This provision is identical to a provision in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024) and in HB 2109 (2024) and is substantially similar to provisions in SCS/SB 897 (2024), in SCS/SBs 1221 & 988 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in SB 569 (2023), and in HB 881 (2023).

DEVELOPMENT OR INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY GUARDIANSHIP PETITIONS (SECTION 475.063 AND 488.2300)

This act provides that a parent, physical custodian, or guardian of a minor that has a diagnosed developmental disability or intellectual disability may file a petition with an accompanying affidavit in a form prescribed by the act for emergency, temporary, or full orders for appointment of guardianship of the minor upon the minor attaining the age of eighteen. If the court finds the criteria set forth in the act, or if good cause is shown by the attorney for the minor or ward, the court may enter an order appointing an attorney to represent the parent, physical custodian, or guardian of the minor.

This act also provides that the court shall adopt forms for such petitions and court clerks shall explain to petitioners who are not represented by counsel with the procedures for filing such petitions. Furthermore, this act provides that the court shall accept and act upon a petition without requiring a filing fee. Additionally, any expenses incurred for attorney's fees for the attorney of the minor or ward and the fees for certain court-appointed individuals in guardianship and conservatorship hearings shall be reimbursed from the Family Services and Justice Fund, which moneys may be appropriated into by the General Assembly.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024) and are similar to provisions in SCS/SB 897 (2024) and in HB 2109 (2024).

CONFIDENTIALITY OF CERTAIN CASES IN COURT CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SECTION 476.1025)

This act provides that a parent, spouse, child, or personal representative of a person who was convicted of a misdemeanor offense may file a motion with a copy of the death certificate in the court of conviction to have the record made confidential on any automated case management system if the person has been deceased for six months or more. Prior to making such conviction confidential, the court shall determine whether any person would be unfairly prejudiced by the confidentiality of such conviction.

This provision is identical to HB 1718 (2024), a provision in HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), and HCS/HB 371 (2023) and is similar to HB 1599 (2022), HB 972 (2021), and HB 2514 (2020).

REPEAL OF THE EXPIRATION DATE OF FUNDING OF BASIC CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR CERTAIN PERSONS (SECTION 477.650)

Currently, the provision of law establishing the Basic Civil Legal Services Fund, which provides funding to legal services organizations in this state to provide civil legal services and representation to eligible low-income persons, is set to expire on December 31, 2025. This act repeals the expiration date.

This provision is identical to HB 1838 (2024) and is substantially similar to SB 946 (2024) and a provision in SCS/HB 2719 (2024).

MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT COURTS (SECTION 478.001)

Currently, the treatment court divisions of the circuit courts may include an adult treatment court, DWI court, family treatment court, juvenile treatment court, and veteran treatment court, which are specialized courts focused on addressing substance abuse disorders, mental health disorders, and co-occurring disorders of certain criminal defendants. This act provides for the establishment of a mental health court within a treatment court division to provide an alternative for the disposal of cases that stem from mental health or co-occurring disorders of criminal defendants.

This provision is identical to a provision in HCS/HB 2700 (2024) and is substantially similar to SB 1370 (2024).

COMPENSATION OF JURORS (SECTIONS 488.040 AND 494.455)

Currently, a juror shall receive seven cents per mile to and from his or her place of residence and the courthouse. This act modifies the mileage rate of jurors to the mileage rate of state employees, which is currently provided at sixty-five and half cents. Current law also provides that grand or petit jurors in certain counties, including in Clay and Greene, shall not receive compensation for the first two days of service, but shall receive fifty dollars with seven cents per mile for the third and any subsequent days that the juror actually serves. This act provides that the governing body of the county or the City of St. Louis may adopt a system of juror compensation that provides grand or petit jurors to receive no compensation on the first two days of actual service, but receive fifty dollars with the state employee mileage rate for the third and any subsequent days of actual service.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024) and in HCS/HB 2700 (2024) and are substantially similar to provisions in SCS/SB 1220 (2024) and in SCS/SB 897 (2024) and are similar to HB 1457 (2024).

EXCUSAL FROM JURY DUTY (SECTION 494.430)

Currently, upon timely application to the court, a person who is seventy-five years of age or older shall be excused from service as a petit or grand juror. This act provides that a person who is 70 years of age or older may request to be excused from jury duty. Additionally, any jury duty notification sent to a potential juror shall include a notice specifying that a person may be excused from service if the person is 70 years of age or older.

This provision is identical to HB 1745 (2024) and is similar to HB 1736 (2024), a provision in HCS/SS#2/SB 22 (2023), in HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 104 (2023), in HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 (2023), HB 493 (2023), HB 658 (2023), HB 1887 (2022), HB 609 (2021), and HB 1791 (2020).

EXCLUSION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION IN COURT DOCUMENTS (SECTION 509.520)

Currently, certain information shall be excluded from pleadings, attachments, exhibits, judgments, orders, or other records of the court, but shall be included in a confidential information sheet filed with the court, which shall not be subject to public inspection or availability. This act modifies the provision to include information concerning a witness in a criminal case that is confidential as otherwise provided by law or rule and any other information redacted for good cause by order of the court.

UNIFORM INTERSTATE DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY ACT (SECTIONS 510.500 TO 510.521)

This act establishes the "Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act" which provides procedures for out-of-state subpoenas for certain forms of discovery conducted in Missouri.

To request a subpoena in Missouri, a party shall submit a foreign subpoena to a clerk of the court in the county in which discovery is sought to be conducted. The clerk shall promptly issue a subpoena, which shall incorporate the terms used in the foreign subpoena and include contact information of the attorneys and any party not represented by an attorney in the proceeding to which the subpoena relates. A request for issuance of a subpoena pursuant to this act shall not constitute an appearance in Missouri courts.

The Missouri Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the laws of this state apply to subpoenas issued pursuant to this act and such subpoenas shall be served in compliance with such rules and laws. Additionally, an application for a protective order or to enforce, quash, or modify a subpoena issued by clerk of this state shall comply with such court rules and laws of this state. However, in applying and construing this act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity among the states.

These provisions shall apply to requests for discovery in cases pending on August 28, 2024.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HB 1452 (2024), HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 84 (2023), in SCS/HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), HB 1549 (2022), HB 347 (2021), and HB 2570 (2020) and are substantially similar to provisions in SCS/SB 897 (2024), SB 394 (2023), and SB 1005 (2022).

ACCESS TO MATERIAL HARMFUL TO MINORS BY COMMERCIAL ENTITIES (SECTION 537.106)

This act provides that any commercial entity that knowingly or intentionally publishes or distributes material harmful to minors, as defined in the act, on the internet from a website that contains a substantial portion of such harmful materials shall verify, as provided in the act, that any person attempting access to such materials is 18 years of age or older. Any commercial entity that fails to use and verify the age of those accessing the harmful materials shall be subject to civil liability for damages resulting from a minor's access and reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

This provision is identical to HB 1426 (2024) and HB 1855 (2024) and is similar to a provision in SB 961 (2024).

CIVIL LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYERS HIRING EX-OFFENDERS ACT (SECTION 537.580)

This act establishes the "Civil Liability for Employers Hiring Ex-Offenders Act" which provides that a cause of action shall not be brought against an employer, general contractor, premises owner, or other third party for hiring an employee or independent contractor who has been convicted of an offense, excluding certain violent and sexual offenses listed in the act.

In an action for negligent hiring against an employer, general contractor, premises owner, or other third party for acts of an employee or independent contractor that is based on a theory of liability not covered by this act, the fact that the employee or independent contractor was convicted of a nonviolent, nonsexual offense before the employee or independent contractor's employment or contractual obligation with the employer, general contractor, premises owner, or other third party shall be inadmissible as evidence.

This act shall not preclude any existing cause of action for failure of an employer to provide adequate supervision of an employee or independent contractor, except that the conviction of a nonviolent, nonsexual offense may be admissible as evidence in such action if the employer:

(1) Knew of the conviction or was grossly negligent in the failure to know of the conviction; and

(2) The conviction was directly related to the nature of the employee's or independent contractor's work and the conduct that gave rise to the alleged injury that is basis of the action.

The protections of this act provided to an employer, general contractor, premises owner, or third party do not apply in an action concerning:

(1) The misuse of funds or property of a person other than the employer, general contractor, premises owner, or third party by an employee or independent contractor, if, on the date the employee or independent contractor was hired, the employee or independent contractor had been convicted of an offense that includes fraud or the misuse of funds or property as an element, and it was foreseeable that the position for which the employee or independent contractor was hired would involve the discharge of a fiduciary responsibility in the management of the funds or property;

(2) The misappropriation of funds by an employee or independent contractor if the employee or independent contractor was hired as an attorney and, if on the date of hiring, the employee or independent contractor had been convicted of a crime that includes fraud or the misuse of funds or property as an element; or

(3) A violent offense or an improper use of excessive force by an employee or independent contractor hired to serve as a law enforcement officer or security guard.

The provisions of this act shall not be interpreted as implying a cause of action exists for negligent hiring of an individual convicted of an offense in situations not covered by this section.

This act is identical to HB 1969 (2024), HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), and HB 720 (2023), and is similar to SB 352 (2023).

FUNDING FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER (SECTION 600.042)

Under current law, any funds available from government grants, private gifts, donations, bequests, or other sources made to the Office of the Public Defender are deposited in the general revenue fund of the state.

This act creates the "Public Defender - Federal and Other Fund" in the state treasury and provides that funding from any government grants, private gifts, donations, bequests, or other sources shall be deposited into such fund.

This provision is identical to a provision in HCS/HB 2700 (2024), HB 2382 (2024), and HB 2370 (2022) and is substantially similar to SS#2/SCS/SBs 754, 746, 788, 765, 841, 887 & 861 (2024), SCS/SB 897 (2024), SB 1379 (2024), SCS/HCS/HB 1659 (2024), SB 245 (2023), SB 1039 (2022), and in SCS/HB 2088, HB 1705 & HCS/HB 1699 (2022).

KATIE O'BRIEN