WORKERS' COMPENSATION (SECTIONS 287.200 TO 287.835 & 621.045)

The act permits the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") to change the name, information, or fee arrangement of the attorney or law firm representing a claimant upon the filing of a written agreement, signed by both the claimant and the attorney, with the Commission.

Current law requires a retention vote be taken by the Administrative Law Judge Review Committee ("Committee") with respect to each workers' compensation Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Additionally, the Committee is required to conduct performance audits periodically and make recommendations of confidence or no confidence with respect to each ALJ. This act repeals these requirements and instead creates new provisions for filing complaints against and removing ALJs.

The act repeals a requirement that members of the Committee not have any direct or indirect employment or financial connection with a workers' compensation insurance company, claims adjustment company, health care provider nor be a practicing workers' compensation attorney. The act additionally repeals a requirement that all members of the Committee have a working knowledge of workers' compensation.

The act permits the Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation to file a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commission ("AHC") seeking to remove an ALJ from office for one or any combination of the following causes:

(1) The ALJ has committed any criminal offense as described in the act, regardless of whether a criminal charge has been filed;

(2) The ALJ has been convicted, or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal prosecution under the laws of any state, the United States, or of any country, regardless of whether sentence is imposed or is guilty of misconduct;

(3) Habitual intoxication;

(4) Willful neglect of duty;

(5) Corruption in office;

(6) Incompetency; or

(7) The ALJ has committed any act that involves moral turpitude or oppression in office.

Prior to filing a complaint, the Director shall notify the ALJ in writing of the reasons for the complaint. Special provisions are included if the reason for the complaint is willful neglect of duty or incompetency.

Upon a finding by the AHC that:

(1) The grounds for disciplinary action are met, the Director may, singly or in combination, issue disciplinary actions against the ALJ, as provided in the act, including removal or suspension from office; or

(2) There are no grounds for disciplinary action, the ALJ shall immediately resume duties and shall receive any attorney's fees due under current law.

An ALJ may be suspended with pay, without notice, at the discretion of the Director if:

(1) The ALJ commits a crime for which the ALJ is being held without bond for a period of more than 14 days;

(2) The ALJ's license to practice law has been suspended or revoked; or

(3) A declaration of incapacity by a court of competent jurisdiction has been made with respect to the ALJ.

The act provides that the compensation for ALJs and chief administrative law judges shall be determined solely by the rate outlined in law and shall not increase when pay raises for executive employees are appropriated.

The act furthermore repeals reference to the position of Chief Legal Counsel.

The act repeals a prohibition on the payment of any retirement benefits under workers' compensation law to any administrative law judge who has been removed from office by impeachment or for misconduct, or to any person who has been disbarred from the practice of law, or to the beneficiary of any such persons.

These provisions are identical to SB 667 (2025), are substantially similar to SCS/SB 1390 (2024) and certain provisions in SCS/HCS/HB 2064 & HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), and are similar to HB 2194 (2024).

COURT DISSOLUTION OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (SECTION 347.143)

The act modifies the procedure by which a court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company. Specifically, in addition to circumstances where it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the operating agreement, the court may issue such a decree if it determines:

(1) Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining members;

(2) The business of the limited liability company has been abandoned;

(3) The management of the limited liability company is deadlocked or subject to internal dissension;

(4) The business operations are substantially impaired; or

(5) Those in control of the limited liability company have been found guilty of, or have knowingly countenanced, persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority.

This provision is identical to a provision in HCS/HB 83 (2025), HB 125 (2025), and in HCS/HB 176 (2025) and is similar to a provision in SB 352 (2025), in SCS/SB 897 (2024), HB 1458 (2024), in SCS/HCS/HB 2064 & HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 85 (2023), HB 278 (2023), SB 401 (2023), and SB 475 (2023).

MISSOURI ELECTRONIC WILLS AND ELECTRONIC ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS ACT (SECTIONS 474.540 TO 474.564)

This act establishes the "Missouri Electronic Wills and Electronic Estate Planning Documents Act" which provides for the execution of wills through electronic methods.

An electronic will shall be a will for all purposes of the laws of this state. An electronic will is a record that is readable, and remains accessible, as text at the time of signing by the testator or by another individual in the testator's name, in the testator's physical presence, and by the testator's direction. Additionally, an electronic will shall be signed by at least two individuals in the physical or electronic presence of the testator within a reasonable amount of time after witnessing the signing of the will or acknowledgment of the will or signing. Furthermore, an electronic will that has not been executed in compliance with these requirements shall still be considered an electronic will under this act if executed in compliance with the law of the jurisdiction where the testator is physically located when the will was signed or where the testator is domiciled or resides when the will is signed or upon his or her death.

The intent of the testator that the record be an electronic will may be established by extrinsic evidence. As provided in the act, an electronic will may be made self-proving by acknowledgment of the testator.

An electronic will may revoke all or part of a previous will and an electronic will shall be revoked by use of:

(1) A subsequent will that revokes the electronic will expressly or by inconsistency;

(2) A written instrument signed by the testator declaring the revocation; or

(3) A physical act, if established by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator, with the intent of revoking, performed or directed another individual to perform the act in the testator's physical presence.

Additionally, if there is evidence that a testator signed an electronic will, but neither the electronic will nor a certified paper copy can be located after a testator's death, there shall be a presumption that the testator revoked the electronic will, even if no instrument or later will revoking such electronic will can be located. At any time during the administration of the estate or as determined by the court if there is no grant of administration, the court may issue an order for a custodian of an account held under a terms-of-service agreement to disclose digital assets for purposes of obtaining an electronic will from the account of a deceased user.

Furthermore, this act provides that any written estate planning document, as defined in the act, may be executed electronically and no such estate planning document shall be invalid or void solely because of its electronic form or electronic signatures. Any written estate planning document that requires one or more witnesses to the signature of a principal may be witnessed by any individual in the electronic presence of the principal. Additionally, this act provides that a person who acts in reliance upon an electronically executed written estate planning document shall not be liable to any person for so relying and may assume without inquiry the valid execution of the electronically executed written estate planning document.

An individual may create a certified paper copy of an electronic will or estate planning document by affirming under penalty of perjury that a paper copy of the electronic will or document is a complete, true, and accurate copy. If a provision of law or rule of procedure requires a will or document to be presented or retained in its original form or provides consequences for the failure to present or retain the will or document in its original form, a certified paper copy shall satisfy the provision or rule.

This act also supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, except for certain provisions relating to consumer disclosures, and does not authorize electronic delivery of certain notices.

Finally, this act shall apply to any will of a decedent who dies on or after August 28, 2025, and to any written estate planning document signed or remotely witnessed on or after August 28, 2025.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HCS/HB 83 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 176 (2025), in SB 289 (2025), in SB 428 (2025), and in SCS/HCS/HB 1259 (2025), and are substantially similar to provisions in HB 180 (2025), in SCS/SB 897 (2024), in SCS/SBs 1221 & 988 (2024), in SCS/HCS#2/HB 1886 & HCS/HB 2064 (2024), in HB 2109 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in SB 569 (2023), and in HB 881 (2023).

JUDICIAL PRIVACY ACT (SECTIONS 476.1300 TO 476.1313)

This act modifies the Judicial Privacy Act by providing for the regulation of the use of personal information of certain court-related officers, including circuit clerks, court administrators, deputy circuit clerks, division clerks, municipal clerks, juvenile officers, and chief deputy juvenile officers.

The act provides that the Judicial Privacy Act shall not apply to personal information present in records of court proceedings on the statewide court automation system (Missouri Case.net). Additionally, under this act, no person, business, or association shall publicly post or display on the internet a judicial officer's personal information if such person, business, or association has received a written request, rather than if the judicial officer has provided written consent or made a written request.

These provisions are substantially similar to HCS/HB 1457 (2025).

BASIC CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FUND (SECTION 477.650)

Currently, the provision of law establishing the Basic Civil Legal Services Fund, which provides funding to legal services organizations in this state to provide civil legal services and representation to eligible low-income persons, is set to expire on December 31, 2025. This act repeals the expiration date.

This provision is identical to a provision in SS#2/SCS/SB 10 (2025), in HCS/HB 83 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 87 (2025), HB 124 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 176 (2025), in HCS/HB 179 (2025), HB 181 (2025), in the truly agreed to and finally passed HCS/SS/SB 218 (2025), in HCS/SS/SB 221 (2025), in SCS/SBs 391 & 355 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 1259 (2025), HB 1838 (2024), and in SCS/HCS/HB 2064 & HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024) and is substantially similar to SB 946 (2024) and a provision in SCS/HB 2719 (2024).

COMPENSATION OF JURORS (SECTIONS 488.040 & 494.455)

Currently, a juror shall receive seven cents per mile to and from his or her place of residence and the courthouse. This act modifies the mileage rate of jurors to the mileage rate of state employees, which is currently provided at sixty-five and half cents. Current law also provides that grand or petit jurors in certain counties, including in Clay and Greene, shall not receive compensation for the first two days of service, but shall receive fifty dollars with seven cents per mile for the third and any subsequent days that the juror actually serves. This act provides that the governing body of the county or the City of St. Louis may adopt a system of juror compensation that provides grand or petit jurors to receive no compensation on the first two days of actual service, but receive fifty dollars with the state employee mileage rate for the third and any subsequent days of actual service.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HCS/HB 83 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 176 (2025), in SB 352 (2025), SB 447 (2025), in SCS/SB 897 (2024), SCS/SB 1220 (2024), and in SCS/HCS/HB 2064 & HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), is substantially similar to provisions in HB 131 (2025), in the truly agreed to and finally passed HCS/SS/SB 218 (2025), in HCS/SS/SB 221 (2025), and in SCS/HCS/HB 2700 (2024), and is similar to HB 1457 (2024).

ST. LOUIS CITY CIRCUIT COURT CIVIL CASE FILING SURCHARGE (SECTION 488.426)

Currently, any circuit court may collect a civil case filing surcharge of an amount not to exceed $15 for the maintenance of a law library, the county's or circuit's family services and justice fund, or courtroom renovation and technology enhancement. If the circuit court reimburses the state for salaries of family court commissioners or is the circuit court in Jackson County, the surcharge may be up to $20. This act provides that the circuit court in the City of St. Louis may charge a filing surcharge up to $20.

This provision is identical to SB 18 (2025), a provision in HCS/HB 83 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 176 (2025), in SB 352 (2025), SB 800 (2025), in HB 1512 (2024), and in SCS/HCS/HB 2064 & HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), and is substantially similar to a provision in SCS/SB 897 (2024), SB 1023 (2024), CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), SB 252 (2023), HB 787 (2023), in HCS/HB 986 (2023), in the perfected HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), SB 1209 (2022), HB 1963 (2022), HB 143 (2021), HB 1554 (2020), HB 1224 (2019), in the perfected HCS/HB 1083 (2019), HB 1891 (2018), SB 288 (2017), HB 391 (2017), and SB 812 (2016).

ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (SECTIONS 491.075 & 492.304)

Under current law, a statement made by a child under 14 years of age may be admissible in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances. This act changes the age to a child under the age of 18 years of age.

Additionally, this act provides that visual or audio recordings of a child under 18 years of age or a vulnerable person relating to certain criminal offenses shall be admissible in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances.

These provisions are identical to provisions in SB 143 (2025), SCS/SB 897 (2024), SCS/SB 1245 (2024), SS/SCS/HCS/HB 1659 (2024), HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), SCS/HCS/HB 2700 (2024), the perfected HCS/HB 454 (2023), and SCS/HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 & HCS/HB 1133 (2023).

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DETERMINATIONS (SECTION 536.140)

This act modifies the standard for review for a state agency's interpretation of statutes, rules, regulations, and other subregulatory documents. Specifically, a court or administrative hearing officer shall interpret the meaning and effect of such statutes, rules, regulations, and documents de novo, rather than de novo upon motion by a party if the action only involves the agency's application of the law to the facts and does not involve administrative discretion. Further, after applying customary tools of interpretation, the court or officer shall decide any remaining doubt in favor of a reasonable interpretation that limits agency power and maximizes individual liberty.

This provision is identical to SS/SB 221 (2025) and is substantially similar to HB 663 (2025).

UNIFORM PUBLIC EXPRESSION PROTECTION ACT (SECTION 537.529 & THE REPEAL OF SECTION 537.528)

This act establishes the "Uniform Public Expression Protection Act". Currently, any action against a person for conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of the state or a political subdivision thereof is subject to a special motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment and any such motion shall be considered by the court on a priority or expedited basis. This act repeals this provision and creates procedures for dismissal of causes of action asserted in a civil action based on a person's:

(1) Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding;

(2) Communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; or

(3) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Missouri Constitution, on a matter of public concern.

However, this act shall not apply to a cause of action asserted:

(1) Against a governmental unit, as described in the act, or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity;

(2) By a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a law to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety; or

(3) Against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the sale or lease of such goods or services.

No later than 60 days after a party is served with a complaint, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading that asserts a cause of action covered by this act, or at a later time upon a showing of good cause, a party may file a special motion to dismiss. The court shall hear and rule on such motion no later than 60 days after the filing of the motion, unless the court orders a later hearing to allow for limited discovery or upon good cause. However, this act provides that the court shall hear and rule on the motion for dismissal no later than 60 days after the order allowing for discovery.

This act provides that all other proceedings between the moving party and the responding party in the action, including discovery and any pending hearings or motions, shall be stayed upon the filing of the special motion to dismiss. Additionally, this act provides that the court may stay, upon motion by the moving party, a hearing or motion involving another party or discovery by another party if a ruling on such hearing or motion or discovery relates to a legal or factual issue.

Any stay pursuant to this act shall remain in effect until the entry of an order ruling on the special motion to dismiss and the expiration of the time to appeal the order. A moving party may appeal an order denying the special motion to dismiss in whole or in part within 21 days of such order. If a party appeals an order ruling on a special motion to dismiss, this act provides that all proceedings between all parties shall be stayed until the conclusion of the appeal.

The court may allow discovery if a party shows that specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied or failed to satisfy the requirements of this act and such information is not reasonably available without discovery. Additionally, a motion for costs and expenses, voluntary dismissal, or a motion to sever shall not be stayed. During a stay, the court upon good cause may hear and rule on any motions unrelated to the special motion to dismiss and any motions seeking a special or preliminary injunction to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety.

In ruling on a special motion to dismiss, this act provides that the court shall consider the parties' pleadings, the motion, any replies and responses to the motion, and any evidence that could be considered in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The court shall dismiss the cause of action with prejudice if:

(1) The moving party has established that the cause of action is covered by this act;

(2) The responding party has failed to establish that this act does not apply to the cause of action; and

(3) Either the responding party failed to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action, or the moving party has established that the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted or that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a cause of action that is subject to a special motion to dismiss pursuant to this act shall not affect the moving party's right to obtain a ruling on the motion and seek costs, reasonable attorneys' fees, and reasonable litigation expenses. Additionally, if the moving party prevails on the motion, this act provides that such costs, fees, and expenses shall be awarded to the moving party. A voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a cause of action that is subject to a special motion to dismiss establishes that the moving party prevailed on the motion. The responding party shall be entitled to such costs, fees, and expenses if the responding party prevails on the motion and the court finds that the motion was frivolous or filed solely with the intent to delay the proceeding.

Finally, this act applies to causes of action filed or asserted on or after August 28, 2025.

These provisions are identical to SB 503 (2025), provisions in SCS/HCS/HB 1259 (2025), and SB 1293 (2024) and are substantially similar to provisions in HCS/HB 83 (2025), in SB 352 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 176 (2025), HB 1092 (2025), in SCS/SB 897 (2024), HB 1785 (2024), in SCS/HCS/HB 2064 & HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), SB 432 (2023), HB 750 (2023), in HCS/SS#2/SCS/SB 968 (2022), SB 1219 (2022), HB 2624 (2022), and HB 1151 (2021).

OFFENSES OF ENTICEMENT OF A CHILD AND PATRONIZING PROSTITUTION (SECTIONS 566.151 & 567.030)

Under current law, a person over 21 years old commits the offense of enticement of a child if he or she persuades any person less than 15 years old to engage in sexual conduct. This act changes the age to less than 17 years old.

Additionally, this act modifies the offense of patronizing prostitution. If the person patronized for prostitution is ages 15 to 17 it shall be a class E felony and if the person is less than 15 years old it shall be a class B felony.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HCS/SS/SCS/SB 60 (2025), in HCS/SS/SB 66 (2025), in HB 83 (2025), in SB 143 (2025), in SB 148 (2025), in HCS/HB 219 (2025), SB 352 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 1464 (2025), in SS#2/SCS/SB 811 (2024), SB 906 (2024), SB 1245 (2024), in SS/SCS/HCS/HB 1659 (2024), in HCS/SS#3/SB 22 (2023), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in HCS/HB 454 (2023), in HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 (2023), HB 1637 (2022), in SCS/HB 2088, HB 1705 & HCS/HB 1699 (2022), HB 2590 (2022), and in SCS/HB 2697, HB 1589, HB 1637 & HCS/HB 2127 (2022) and are similar to provisions in HCS/HB 224 (2025), in SB 284 (2025), in SB 755 (2025), in SB 1398 (2024), and in HCS/HBs 1706 & 1539 (2024).

OFFENSES INVOLVING THE JUDICIARY (SECTIONS 575.095 & 575.260) This act provides that any person convicted of the offense of tampering with a judicial officer and the offense of tampering with a judicial proceeding shall not be eligible for parole, probation, or conditional release.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HCS/SS/SB 218 (2025), SB 453 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 1259 (2025), in HCS/HB 1457 (2025), SB 1441 (2024), and in the perfected HCS/HB 2700 (2024).

HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION FUND (SECTION 589.700)

This act provides that the court shall award restitution payable to the newly created Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation Fund when a person pleads guilty to or is convicted of a human trafficking offense. The Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation Fund shall allocate funds as described in the act towards local rehabilitation services for victims of human trafficking and local efforts to prevent human trafficking.

This provision is substantially similar to a provision in SB 143 (2025), SB 284 (2025), SB 1398 (2024), SS/SCS/HCS/HB 1659 (2024), and SCS/HCS/HBs 1706 & 1539 (2024), and is similar to a provision in SB 906 (2024).

CRIME VICTIMS' COMPENSATION FUND (SECTION 595.045)

This act adds that a person who pleads guilty to a class E felony shall pay a fee of $46 payable to the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund.

This provision is identical to a provision in SS/SCS/HCS/HB 1659 (2024), SCS/SB 897 (2024), HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), HCS/HB 2700 (2024), HCS/SS#3/SB 22 (2023), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), and in HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 (2023).

CYBER CRIME INVESTIGATION FUND (SECTION 650.120)

This act extends, from December 31, 2024, to December 31, 2034, the sunset date of the grant program created under the Cyber Crime Investigation Fund.

This provision is identical to a provision in SCS/HCS/HB 87 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HB 1259 (2025), and in SS/HCS/HB 1464 (2025) and is similar to a provision in HCS/SS/SCS/SB 60 (2025).

KATIE O'BRIEN