I've been a family law practitioner for 20 years. I practice on the other side of the state, although I grew up in St. Louis. I am a member of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, and have an enormous interest in the welfare of children in this state.

     What I would like to say today is that I think that in this process, one of the things that you all have to keep in mind is the best interest of children and not necessarily the rights of parents, and I'm afraid that much of the direction of your questions, much of the directions of the legislative solutions that were discussed last year failed to really consider the impact on children of the legislation that you produced.

     I have a lot of points I'd like cover. I'm going to hit a few of them sort of short and sweet just to give you my response to some of the testimony that you've heard today.

     For example, the notion that we enforce the criminal penalty  - have you ever seen a child watch a policeman drag their dad off because he was yelling at mom, or take mom, because she failed to let dad have the children at 7:15? What are the criminal penalties going to produce in terms of more cooperative parenting?

     Secondly, do criminal penalties really ensure compliance? I know we have a measure for criminal penalties for the enforcement of child support, and does it really help when dad is put in jail when he hasn't paid his child support? I'm not in favor of that penalty that already exists in the law, nor do I think you should secure compliance through criminal penalties.

     I agree that we need expedited and easy access, but we can't have it without due process, and, particularly in Senate Bill 361, I think some of the measures that were implemented to increase the facility with which the state agency can determine if there's a child support arrearage, why in the fact of due process? You know, if I'm not at the previous mailing address and a notice was mailed to a wrong address, and 20 days later, I have no ability to object to it, whether the post office made a mistake or not, I think we're forgetting that we need to protect everyone's rights.

     Now, one of the other areas that I think we need to deal with, and I'm not a psychologist. I do have a background in sociology, but I have made it a point as part of my practice, as a lawyer, to inform myself on the latest psychological literature relating to children.

     In April, I attended a Joint Responsored Seminar by the American Bar Association and the American Psychological Association. We spent two days seriously considering how the interrelationship  between the legal and the psychological professions impact children, how laws impact children, and I beg to differ with the impression that you were given today by the psychiatrist from Texas that the, in fact, the literature in the psychological field, represents that the presumption of joint custody is the appropriate and the best outcome.

     What, in fact, the conclusion of most of the studies have been is that high conflict, significant post-divorce conflict is what seriously, negatively impacts children.

     One of the materials here that I will quote from, hadn't intended to discuss this topic, but a major exception to the positive benefits of more frequent non-custodial parent-child visitation, is when the parents have highly conflictual relationships that involve the children. In these cases, more frequent visitation between parent and child, they actually be detrimental to the child's adjustment, because of the high level of conflict and negativity that the child experiences when the parents encounter each other. Families with high levels of conflict are usually not good candidates for custodial arrangements that require significant amounts of cooperative decision making or time together, and there is study after study that concludes that forced co-parenting, forced joint custody, if it results in increased conflict, has a negative impact on children.

     I think that the, and I will make these materials available, which lists these studies.

     I think another thing that you have to do is when you evaluate the testimony, read the study. How many families were involved? What was the definition of joint custody? Was it joint physical? Was it joint legal? How did they ascertain and measure the success of the outcomes? I think you will find, that, in fact, the overwhelming conclusion of the research, so far, is that it is best to look at the individual family unit and figure out what is best for that family, in their particular circumstances, and not to prejudge, or predetermine a result based on an aggregate statistical figure that may have nothing to do with this child and this family.

     Now, therefore, I think we should stay with our current statute insofar as it allows the court all the options that the court can decide. It doesn't tell the court that for this family we presume that this is the best way, or for this family, you start with this preference and go down. It says here are the available options. If these parents can't agree, decide what it is that you think will be best for this family.

     Now, in addition to the issue of custody, I have been working with members of the bar who have been trying to come up with a solution that a lot of you have asked about today, which is relocation.

     Relocation is a terribly difficult area for the parents, for the practitioner, for the court. How do we deal with the increasing mobility in our society that often causes the need for involuntary relocation, and the overwhelming desire to maximum the children's good outcomes by contact with their parents, and what we are working on with the members of the family law section of the Missouri Bar, is a proposal that I think once we pass it through our various levels of approval, we'll recommend a model of relocation that's based on a two-year study that was done by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

     Last spring, the academy adopted a model relocation act, and this was after many, many hours, I should say hundreds of hours, of study of it's context, and, ultimately, after reviewing the theoretical research, the academy came up with a notion that there are, in some situations, a parent shouldn't be allowed to move, and in other situations, the parents should be allowed to move. In those states where there was a bar to moving, the outcomes for children were not necessarily better than in those states that easily allowed a parent to move. I think Missouri is in the right place in terms of its standards which require a case by case examination of the motivation, the situation, the voluntariness, and involuntariness of the move. However, the process by which this whole notion of relocation is addressed lacks.

     What we will be proposing is that in every order, with regard to custody, there would be a statement that a parent or a person who has the primary custody or joint custody, and in some instances, under our statute, that could be a grandparent, or even a nonrelative, would have to provide notice, in writing, to the other parties affected, which could include another custodial parent or a grandparent visitation rights, and this would be advance notice of the intent to move, and the intended new residence address, the home telephone number of the new residence, if known, the date of the intended move, a brief statement of the specific reasons for the proposed relocation, and a proposal for a revised schedule of shared physical custody or visitation or temporary custody with the child if applicable. Once this notice has been received by the other parent or person affected by the move, and this is a move across the street, within the state, outside of the state, because any time the primary residence of the child is moved, certainly the other parent should have advance notice of this. Too often we see people who only find out that their children have moved when they show up at school for an activity and suddenly learn from the teacher, perhaps, that the child is no longer there.

     Now, the person who receives the notice would then have an opportunity to lodge an objection to the move and to give the reasons for that objection. The objecting parent would file a proposed plan for, if they're, let's say they're in agreement with the move, but not with the proposal with regard how their timesharing would change. They could provide an alternative plan for timesharing. If they absolutely object to the move, they can present to the court, in their affidavit, their reasons for objecting to the move. There would, therefore, if the parties couldn't resolve their difference, there would be the opportunity for a court hearing to determine when and under what circumstances the move should be allowed.

     This proposal also provides for measures to handle the interim period. You know, we often have difficulty from the day a parent finds out, for example, that they're being transferred, and have an involuntary basis for having to move and the date when you can get to court to have this resolved. So, there are procedures within our proposal that would also allow temporary orders, either allowing a move or preventing a move, pending the ultimate determination. Again, based on the specific facts.

     Now, in reaching its decision, regarding a proposed relocation, we've identified about 13 factors that we think are very important for the court to consider. They're not exclusive, but they cover the four basic statutory factors that now exist, and I can go over those briefly with you.

     The nature quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child's relationship with the person proposing to relocate and that the nonrelating person.

     The reason that I disagree with a 50-mile limit, or a limit on movement that says anything that impacts at all the non-custodial parent's time with the child, is that there are, in fact, some parents who don't sustain their relationship with their children, who don't bother to visit, who are not actively involved, and should the parent who is forced to move because of an involuntary job decision, be required to stay here for a parent who doesn't exercise their opportunities to be with the child, just because the move is going to be 50 miles from here.

     Another significant factor is the age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into consideration any special needs of the child. So, the court can look at. You know if a child moves to California, what school district are they going to be in? Is the child's life going to be enhanced, or is just the desire of the parent to be on the west coast.

     The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating person and the child who's suitable shared custody or visitation are temporary custody arrangements, in view of the distance of the move, and the financial resources of the parties to  allow frequent contact.

     For example, a wealthy family may be more able to allow for frequent and meaningful contact at a larger distance, whereas, a poor family, where you can't afford travel back and forth, the distance might have to be shorter to decide that you could approve the move and still maintain contact. The child's preference taking into consideration the age and maturity of the child. Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of the person seeking relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child in the nonrelocating parent. So, the court could identify a parent who had a consistent pattern of trying to keep the other parent out of their life. By the same token, they could identify a parent who's been very supportive of the relationship, but may have to move again for involuntary reasons, and that's already like five factors. There are many more factors that are included in here, and I would recommend when we further refine and development this, we'll make copies of it available, but I think it's a solution to the dilemma that puts more protections in, sets up a better system for dealing with it, without changing the case by case standard.

     There's another concept that I'd like to take a few minutes to address, and this deals with the notion of joint custody, and forced joint custody.

     One of the terms and concepts that emerged when I was in LA for this conference, was the term called "parallel parenting", and, perhaps we've gotten beyond joint custody, and the notion of forced joint custody to a recognition that there are different parenting styles, and that each parent should be allowed to parent in a manner that's most effective. It recognizes the importance of both parents, doesn't force parents to have joint decisions on everything, in order to allow those parents to be active and involved, and I think the concept of parallel parenting, is one that we might look at in considering the whole notion of whether we should have a presumption of joint custody.

     I would also like to address the changes that were made in child support, in the statute recently passed with regard to college education expenses. I truly agree that we have great difficulties with self-executing statutes. This notion that a parent can determine that they're going to pay the college expenses without any, again, notification, without any way to monitor whether, in fact, these expenses were paid by the parent without the other parent knowing when it's going to occur, I think creates enforcement problems of a large and difficult situation.

     I also think that the notion that college should be allocated 50 percent, which may be interpreted from that statute, it flies in the face of the income shares model, upon which we base child support. The income shares model looks at the proportion of the income of both parents. I think that the disabled and the poor child have been sort of disenfranchised for their educational opportunities by the requirement for 12 hours, and I think that needs to be seriously rethought.

     As a lawyer, I'm opposed to Judge Goeke's idea that we take lawyer's fees out of the marital property. I think I have an inherent conflict, if I'm looking for my fee from the property of the person I'm representing. I agree lawyers should get paid, but I don't think that that's the proper place to do it and I truly don't want to be in a position of having to ask the court to take something away from my client in order to pay my fee.

     I think I'm going to yield now to Margaret, unless you want to have questions of me first.

     CASKEY: No, proceed

     DOUGHERTY: There's some questions here?

     CASKEY: Oh, there are. Representative Ridgeway.

     RIDGEWAY: Thank you. Karen, I'm sorry, for my ignorance on this, but I just don't know the answer to it, and I know it's something that comes up a lot in the Kansas City area, because we're so close to so many jobs, in Johnson County, Kansas. The great fear of many fathers, the non-custodial fathers is that mom's going to move across the state line, and her real intent is to move to Hayes, Kansas, but she alleges she's going to keep the same job and just move across the state line, for whatever reason, access to better school, some such thing as that. Can you walk us through some changes in the realization of how this would work, or your understanding of any of the new UCCJE Act, how that would impact a decision on relocation?

     PLAX: You know, I have to tell you,while I have a copy of the new model act, I really haven't had an opportunity to fully examine how it impacts. I think, as Senator Jacob pointed out, we have so many different bases now for jurisdiction. There's a jurisdictional basis for child support. There's a jurisdictional basis under the PKPA and how the new UCCJA interacts with that, I'm not certain that I have the right answer to that, right now. I do know, though, that with the proposal that we're presenting, the parent would have to identify the new location. She couldn't say I'm moving to Johnson County, and move to Hayes. I mean, that would be part of the - the new address would have to be established and we're suggesting that the notice be given 60 days prior to the move or the earliest date that you know, that you have some reason to move.

     RIDGEWAY: But, if she goes over there, jurisdiction would then ........

     PLAX: Well, the current UCCJA, you have to be in the state for more than six months prior to the jurisdiction moving, and, the home state concept, even under the UCCJA doesn't preclude Missouri from having some involvement still in enforcing orders that initiated, although the home state clearly does change.

     RIDGEWAY: One other question. You said that you were against further criminalization of our domestic relations laws, and I seem to agree with you, but, throw some other options out on the table. We've heard about fines and visitation bonds, and things like that, as possible options. What do you have to say about the concept of fining or visitation......

     PLAX: I'm in favor fines. I think that fines are an appropriate method of enforcement. Sometimes the visitation enforcement, you know, we talk about babies, and it's easy to say, give the baby away.  When we get into teenagers, the enforcement of visitation is a complex situation. Teenagers says, I really don't want to go spend a weekend with my other parent, and it may have nothing to do with the parent that they're primarily residing with, influencing them not to go. They just would rather stay with their friends, or where their activities are. Maybe they're having a personality conflict with the other parent at that time. So, sometimes, holding the primary parent accountable for the visitation problem of teenagers is not necessarily the greatest thing. In LA, one of the judge's solution was taking away the driving privileges of the teenager who didn't visit, so that it wasn't ordering the parent or fining the parent, but, directly affecting the child with some consequences, and so, it's really a complex area with regard to enforcement, but I do think that fines are an appropriate measure. You know, we have used bonds successfully on some of the cases I've been involved in. I think that the judges need to order compensatory time, you know, to say all right, you've lost these days, now you're getting these days. But, you know, frankly, I have found the courts very receptive when I have brought actions for enforcement of visitation. I have not found the lack of judicial interest or concern in this area at all. In fact, we've had - in Jackson County, at least, I think the judges are very sensitive to this area, and do act within their power to assure visitation.

     RIDGEWAY: Thank you.

     CASKEY: Representative Kasten

     KASTEN: Thank you. Would you expound on parallel parenting?

     PLAX: Well, parallel parenting is, essentially, a concept that says when the kids are with me, I decide how they live, in my house, and I set up the rules in my house, and when the kids are with the other parent, she sets up the rules as to how the children function. On major items, I mean seriously major items, like should there be a liver transplant, things that do require the joint decision making, the parents can come together and come up with a joint decision, but that, in reality, we both parent, but we don't have to agree on everything. We don't have to agree that the discipline will be this way or that we will have the child in a particular summer camp. If it's my time, and I want them to have canoe lessons, then I can decide that. So, it's sort of a recognition that there are different styles. There are different values. There are different approaches to what is good for a child, and both may be valid, and that both parents should be able to be the parent they are, rather than try to put them together under some co-parenting notion that maybe people who live in intact families don't operate in the same way.

     KASTEN: Thank you.

     DOUGHERTY: I'd like to follow up on that. Co-parenting - what's the difference between parallel parenting and co-arenting?

     PLAX: Well, there's not the requirement, there is not the requirement to achieve agreement on a lot of issues. There's not the requirement like we come together and we figure these things out together that some forms of joint custody require people to do.

     DOUGHERTY: Based on what a judge tells them in the court order. There's nothing in the statute that determines that it be done that way.

     PLAX: Right, but know, I mean, we're supposed to come up with a parenting plan when we, as part of the statute. So many people put very specific things in their joint custody plan, with regard to how they're going to resolve this decision and that decision. You know, some of the joint custody plans say, I can't enroll the children in an activity that would interfere with the other parent's time. You know, so some of these may be self-imposed, but they appear very frequently in the work we do.

     DOUGHERTY: Okay. Thank you.

     CASKEY: I have one question, Karen. Is getting a haircut, would it be prevalent to a liver transplant?

     PLAX: No.

     CASKEY: But, it is in my area.

     PLAX: Excuse me, Senator.

     CASKEY: But, it's as major - it's a major decision on whether  the child's hair is cut or not. Just some humor.

     Okay, next. Margaret?